












The Determinants of Exit from Nursing Homes 
and the Price Elasticity of Nursing Home Care: 
Evidence from Japanese Micro-level Data 
 

















Hitotsubashi University Research Unit 
for Statistical Analysis in Social Sciences 
A 21st-Century COE Program 
 
Institute of Economic Research   
Hitotsubashi University 
Kunitachi, Tokyo, 186-8603 Japan 
http://hi-stat.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/   1
The Determinants of Exit from Nursing Homes and the Price Elasticity of Nursing 























   2
ABSTRACT 
This study examines how the price mechanism affects the length of residents’ nursing home 
stay and their destination after exit. The purpose of this analysis is to evaluate policy options to 
reduce the number of socially institutionalized elderly nursing home residents in Japan.    To 
address these issues, we take advantage of micro-level data from The Survey on Care Service 
Providers compiled by the Japanese government.    Our duration estimates show that the price 
elasticity of the hazard of exit from welfare care facilities was 1.7 (95% CI: 0.4-3.0) and 1.8 
(95% CI: 0.0-3.8) from health care facilities.    The probit estimates show that a 1 percentage 
point increase in copayments leads to an increase in the probability of returning home by 0.04% 
for patients of welfare care facilities and 3.7% for those of health care  facilities.  In  contrast, 
the price elasticity of the probability of being re-hospitalized is -3.3% for patients of health care 
facilities and -1.9% for those of medical care facilities.    An appropriate price policy may work 
well to shorten patients’ length of stay and to reduce the number of the socially institutionalized.   
Since the effects of the introduction of a price mechanism may differ for different types of 
facilities, public policies aimed at broadening residents’ range of choices need to be designed 
with care and incorporate an appropriate risk adjustment system to provide a safety net for 
those elderly highly at risk of being  socially  institutionalized.   
 
Key words.    Japanese long-term care insurance, social institutionalization, price elasticity; the 
Survey on Care Service Providers; institutional care 
 
INTRODUCTION 
  One of the most serious challenges facing Japan today is the rapid aging of its 
population and the ballooning costs of the medical and long-term care systems   3
associated with this trend.    In the last decade, medical care expenditure for the aged 
(those 70 years of age and older) increased from approximately 6 trillion yen to11 
trillion yen, and its share in total medical expenditure grew from 30% to 37% (Statistics 
Bureau 2004).    Long-term care costs rose six-fold from about 0.6 trillion yen to 3.6 
trillion yen in the same period (Statistics Bureau 2004).    Long-term care consists of 
institutional care provided by nursing homes and formal or paid home-care.     
  A large share of these costs is accounted for by the growing numbers of 
“socially hospitalized” patients and “socially institutionalized” nursing home residents.   
Patients are defined as “socially hospitalized” if they no longer require acute medical 
care but remain hospitalized for more than 180 days, because they require some form of 
care, but have no informal or unpaid caregivers (such as relatives) or sufficient financial 
resources to afford formal home care.    In the same way, nursing home residents are 
defined as “socially institutionalized” if their medical condition would allow them to 
live at home, provided they receive adequate formal or informal home care; but because 
of the lack of such home care, for family or financial reasons, they often remain in 
nursing homes until they die.    Many European countries facing similar problems of 
spiraling health care costs have tried to rein these in by introducing policies aimed at 
transferring patients from medical to long-term care institutions and from institutional to 
home care. 
      In  order  to  tackle  the  issues  of  social hospitalization and institutionalization, the 
Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) introduced the public long-term care 
insurance scheme in 2000 (Mitchell, Piggott and Shimizutani 2004).
 2  Key  aspects  of 
the scheme include the following.    The “firewall” between medical and long-term care 
services was abolished and patients can now choose from a variety of institutions   4
providing a wide range of health care services.    More importantly, the new scheme 
introduced the price mechanism to the home care market for the elderly: users must now 
pay 10% coinsurance for each insured care service.   
  Along with the introduction of the public long-term care insurance scheme, 
MHLW initiated medical care reforms to decrease the number of socially hospitalized 
patients.    In an attempt to separate long-term care insurance and health care insurance 
expenditures, MHLW encourages hospitals to set up wards for long-term care that are 
separate from wards for acute medical care.    The separated wards (called long-term 
medical care wards) are intended to support patients while preparing to transfer them 
from acute medical care to low-level home care.    A further element of the reform is 
that the coinsurance rate for insured care services now rises from 10% to 15% when a 
patient occupies an acute-care bed for more than 180 days. 
  These reforms are expected to reduce the number of socially hospitalized 
patients by transferring them to other care institutions.    Yet, this strategy can be only 
part of the solution of the problem of social  institutionalization.  Once  socially 
hospitalized patients move from hospital to nursing home, many then become socially 
institutionalized nursing home residents.    Thus, all the reforms have achieved is to 
transfer health care costs for the elderly from the medical care to the long-term care 
system.    The next step therefore has to be to find ways to transfer socially 
institutionalized nursing home residents to home care. Using the price mechanism can 
provide one important instrument in such a strategy. 
  As far as we are aware, there has been little quantitative research on these 
issues.    Yet, without such research, it is difficult to determine how effective price 
signals are in steering the elderly from institutional to home care.    The effectiveness of   5
price signals is a particularly pertinent question for policy formulation, since the prices 
of insured care services are regulated by the central government.    The primary purpose 
of this study therefore is to examine the effect of copayment on the demand for nursing 
home care as a proxy for the price elasticity of demand for institutional care.    To this 
end, we estimate a duration model to evaluate the effect of prices on the length of 
elderly persons’ nursing home stay.    We also estimate a probit model in order to 
examine how prices may affect the number of socially institutionalized nursing home 
residents and how prices influence an elderly person’s destination after exit from 
nursing home.    If the price mechanism works, an appropriate pricing policy may help 
to shorten the average length of residents’ nursing home stay and to reduce the number 
of socially institutionalized residents.   
 
PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
  As far as we know, no empirical research has been carried out that analyzes the 
exit of nursing home residents in Japan.    We are therefore forced to focus in our 
literature review on studies conducted in the United States.    Yet, even among the many 
studies that examine the demand for long-term care and the entry and exit of nursing 
home residents in the United States, there are relatively few that focus on economic 
factors such as the price of nursing home services, residents’ income, and assets.    Since 
the key issue to be examined in this study is whether the price mechanism has an effect 
on nursing home use, we concentrate in our review on those studies that have 
investigated the price elasticity of demand for institutional care.   
  One such study is the one by Chiswick (1976), who used aggregate 
cross-section data to estimate the price elasticity of nursing home demand and   6
concluded that a one percent increase in price reduces demand by 2.3 percent.    Using 
state-level data to measure price elasticity, Scanlon (1980) found that a one percent 
price increase reduces nursing home demand by 1.1 percent.    Garber and MaCurdy 
(1989), instead of looking at price elasticity, examined factors that affected the 
likelihood of admission to a nursing home. Using a transition probability model, they 
found that the likelihood of being admitted to a nursing home was lowered by home 
ownership and co-residence with children but not related with income.    Ingram and 
Kleinman (1989) used a discrete-time hazard function approach and concluded that 
home ownership decreased the likelihood of entering a nursing facility while living 
alone increased it.    The effects of other factors such as income, marital status, and the 
availability of informal home care were found to be not significant.  Finally, Headen 
(1993) examined the price elasticity of nursing home entry using micro-level data and 
the Cox proportional hazard model.    He concluded that the hazard of nursing home 
entry was reduced by wealth but enhanced by the opportunity cost of informal 
caregivers’ time.    The estimated price elasticity of the hazard of nursing home entry 
was  -0.7.   
  The results show that, to some extent, the price mechanism works to reduce the 
demand for nursing home care, controlling for various risk factors that affect the 
likelihood of institutionalization.    Although the characteristics of the nursing home 
industry in the United States are very different from those in Japan, the results support 
our empirical hypothesis that an appropriate pricing policy would contribute to solving 
the problem of social institutionalization.   
 
DATA   7
  The data utilized in this study are micro-level data from the Survey on Care 
Service Providers (Kaigo Service Shisetsu Jigyosho Chosa) conducted by MHLW. The 
survey has been performed annually since 2000, when the public long-term insurance 
scheme was introduced. The data used for this study are from the survey conducted in 
September 2000, as we were unable to access a more recent version. The survey is a 
census and contains detailed information on the characteristics of each facility, 
including the type and quantity of care services provided, and on each resident staying 
in a facility, including information on age, health, family status, and the amount of 
copayment.   
  It may be useful at this point to briefly describe the characteristics of different 
types of institutions in Japan’s nursing home industry.    Three types can be 
distinguished: long-term care welfare facilities for the elderly (henceforth, “welfare care 
facilities”); long-term care health facilities for the elderly (henceforth, “health care 
facilities”); and long-term care medical facilities for the elderly (henceforth, “medical 
care facilities”).    Welfare care facilities are designed to provide institutional care 
service for those who require constant care but who do not live with any informal 
caregivers at home.    These facilities do not provide medical care and residents often 
remain until they die.    In contrast, the other types of nursing home offer medical 
treatment.    Health care facilities aim to offer institutional care for elderly persons in 
transition from hospital to home care.    Residents are in a stable condition and require 
rehabilitation, long-term care or medical care, but do not require hospitalization.
3  
Finally, medical care facilities offer care for residents who need constant clinical 
intervention such as catheterization.   
  The total sample consists of 87,687 residents in 4,463 welfare care facilities;   8
87,555 residents in 2,667 health care facilities; and 39,065 residents in 3,930 medical 
care facilities.    From the total sample, we use only those observations for which the 
length of stay is available.    The cut-off date is September 30, 2000, and if a resident 
was staying at a nursing home on this date, we treated the duration of stay as being 
truncated.    Further, we confine our sample to observations for which information on 
personal characteristics (age and family status) and health status on admission are 
available. After these eliminations, the number of residents in the sample falls to 1,556 
(2% out of 87,687) in welfare facilities, 14,134 (16% out of 87,555) in health care 
facilities, and 2,828 (7% out of 39,065) in medical care facilities.    Because detailed 
information on residents is most likely to be missing for those institutionalized a long 
time ago, our estimates are likely to be biased.   
  Table 1 reports the basic statistics for the sample by type of nursing home.   
The mean length of stay is about 1,440 days for welfare care facilities, 185 for health 
care facilities, and 395 for medical care facilities.    The longer stay in welfare care 
facilities is consistent with the exit pattern for elderly residents described above.   
Copayment is highest in health care facilities, followed by medical care facilities.  
Clinical treatment provided by health and medical care facilities is more costly than the 
provision of help with everyday tasks provided by welfare care facilities.    Men make 
up the majority residents in all types of facilities, with their share ranging from 73% in 
welfare care facilities to 65% in medical care facilities.    The average age of residents 
ranges from 85 years in the former to 82 years in the latter.    Finally, the residents most 
likely to receive informal care from relatives are those in health care facilities (26.6%), 
followed by those in medical care facilities (23.9%), while only 20.2% of welfare care 
facility residents receive informal care.    Looking at residents’ health status by type of   9
nursing home, those in welfare care facilities typically require the greatest level of care, 
are more likely to suffer from dementia, and are more likely to be bedridden.   
Adjusting for these key variables, in the next section we estimate the effect of 
copayment on the demand for nursing home care as a proxy for the price elasticity of 
demand for nursing home care.    Since welfare, health, and medical care facilities 
provide completely different kinds of services, we examine the price elasticity in each 
type of facility care market separately.           
 
THE DETERMINANTS OF THE LENGTH OF   
NURSING HOME STAYS   
  Suppose that the optimal health stock of elderly person i is given by 
*
i H  and 
is a function of his or her investments in three types of long-term care: nursing home 
care (
N
i C ), formal or paid home care (
F
i C ), and informal or unpaid home care (
I
i C ).  
N P  and 
F P   are the prices of nursing-home care and formal home care, while 
I P 
represents informal caregivers’ opportunity cost.    Under these circumstances, we can 
derive the conditional demand functions for nursing home, formal, and informal home 
care as follows: 
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i < ∂ ∂ .    This model shows that the 
demand for each type of long-term care depends on both its own price level and the 
relative price of other forms of care.    In this study, we focus on the effect of prices, 
N P,  
F P , and 
I P , on the demand for nursing home care, 
N
i C .  Applying  a  duration   10
model to the demand function, we define the demand for nursing home care 
N
i C  as  the 
length of an individual nursing home stay.    Therefore, the survival and hazard 
functions of timing to exit are defined as follows:   
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  Our data set does not contain exact indicators for prices since the nursing home 
care industry remains restricted to nonprofit facilities and 
N P   is not determined by 
competition.    Therefore, we use each resident’s copayment for nursing home use as a 
proxy.    We also use the level of care a resident receives as a proxy for 
F P  and  the 
availability of informal care as a proxy for 
I P .  The  proxy  for 
F P   can be justified by 
the fact that the higher the level of care, the lower is the copayment paid by the elderly 
because the long-term care insurance takes care of it.    The proxy for 
I P   is justified by 
the fact that co-resident family members plausibly provide some informal home care 
and the availability of informal home care affects the demand for outside formal home 
care.    Both proxies are considered to be costs in the health production function for an 
elderly person.    d T   represents a censoring indicator taking a value of one if a resident 
had exited the nursing home by the cut-off date, September 30, 2000.    H stands for 
health-related individual characteristics.    Z is a vector of dummies describing the 
characteristics of the institution at which a resident resides.    We estimate the duration 
model for two possible underlying distributions, a Cox-proportional and a Weibull 
distribution. 
     Tables  2  reports  the  estimated  coefficients.    In both estimates, the coefficients on 
copayments as a proxy for 
N P  are  statistically  significant  in the case of welfare care   11
and health care facilities, suggesting that an increase in copayments is likely to lead to 
an earlier exit from such facilities, as indicated by the greater-than-one hazard ratio.   
However, this is not the case for medical care facilities.    In the Cox-proportional 
estimates for welfare care facilities, the hazard ratio is 1.017 (95% confidential interval: 
1.004-1.030), which is very similar to parametric estimates assuming a Weibull 
distribution.    This value means that the price elasticity of the hazard of exit from 
welfare care facilities is 1.7.    For health care facilities, the hazard ratio based on the 
Cox-proportional function is estimated at 1.018 (95% confidential interval: 
0.997-1.038), which is slightly larger than the one for welfare care facilities.    This 
figure implies that the price elasticity of the hazard of exit from health care facilities is 
1.8.    The results suggest that own-price effects on the demand for long-term facility 
care are elastic both in welfare care and health care facilities, but not in medical care 
facilities where the most medically needy are treated.     
  Effects of residents’ care levels as a proxy for 
F P   on the demand of 
institutional care vary among these facilities.    Residents in lower care level categories 
are more likely to be discharged from welfare care facilities (at a 5% significance level).   
While the probability of discharge from health care facilities increases from lower to 
higher levels of care, those requiring higher care levels are less likely to be discharged 
from medical care facilities.    The results suggest that long-term institutional care 
provided by health care facilities is a substitute for formal home care, while that 
provided by welfare care facilities is a complement to formal home care.   
  The presence of informal caregivers 
I P   means that residents are discharged 
from health and medical care facilities earlier than those with no unpaid caregivers.   
This suggests that long-term care provided both by health and medical care facilities   12
acts as a substitute for informal home care.    However, this is not the case for residents 
in welfare care facilities.     
  In sum, the findings suggest that in order to create a system that shortens the 
length of an elderly person’s nursing home stay, a differentiated approach is necessary, 
since the price mechanism seems to affect nursing care demand differently in the three 
types of nursing homes.    In the case of welfare care facilities, raising 
N P   (the cost of 
nursing home care) and lowering 
F P   (the cost of formal home care) for those who are 
less severely ill may shorten the length of residents’ stay.    An increase in 
N P  will  also 
shorten the length of nursing home stay for those in health care facilities who need 
rehabilitation for transition from hospital to home care are.    Lowering 
F P  could  also 
be effective in shortening residents’ length of stay, especially in the case of residents 
requiring greater levels of care.    However, in the case of elderly residents in medical 
care facilities, i.e. the most medically needy, the price mechanism does not seem to 
work well in shortening stays because of inelastic demand. 
 
THE DETERMINANTS OF NURSING HOME EXIT AND   
SUBSEQUENT DESTINATION   
  Our next step is to apply a probit model to the same sample in order to estimate 
the marginal effect of long-term care prices on residents’ destination after nursing home 
exit.    Nursing home stays come to an end for one of three reasons: residents are sent 
home, they are transferred to another institution, or they die.    Figure 1 shows the 
patterns for the different types of nursing facilities.    In the case of residents of welfare 
care facilities, 4% moved to home care; 3% were transferred to other nursing homes; 
32% were re-hospitalized, while 54% died; the remaining 8% stayed on at the same   13
facility, but in our sample these observations are treated as truncated.    In the case of 
residents of health care facilities, 44% moved to home care; 14% were transferred to 
another nursing home; 38% were re-hospitalized; 2% died; and 3% stayed on at the 
same home.    Finally, in the case of residents of medical care facilities, 36% moved to 
home care; 11% were relocated to another facility; 30% were re-hospitalized; 16% died; 
and 8% remained at the same facility.    The differences in these patterns reflect the 
different functions the three types of facilities fulfill, as explained above. What the data 
show is that of the elderly residents exiting nursing homes of any type, a large 
proportion – 30% or more – is transferred to hospitals  and  clinics.  This  illustrates 
clearly how serious the problem of social institutionalization, where residents are 
rotated among long-term care facilities and hospitals or clinics, is.     
  Because the aim of this study is to collect evidence relevant to policy 
information, in this section we focus on those who return to the community after being 
discharged from a nursing home.    Because the aim of this study is to examine policy 
options to shorten the length of nursing home stays, we now turn our attention to what 
determines whether nursing home residents return to the community after being 
discharged or are socially institutionalized by being rotated between long-term care 
facilities and hospitals or clinics. 
  Table 3 shows summary statistics of the data used for the probit estimates.   
The table contains several variables that may be obvious candidates as determinants of 
nursing home exit, such as copayments as a proxy for 
N P , resident’s health status as a 
proxy of 
F P , and their family situation as a proxy for 
I P .    The table also shows that 
if we compare the copayments facing residents that exit one of the three types of 
facilities, those exiting health or medical care facilities face more or less the same costs,   14
no matter whether they move on to home care or are re-hospitalized.    In contrast, those 
exiting welfare care facilities face much lower costs when being re-hospitalized.    This 
finding also implies that welfare care residents face more or less the same copayments 
as residents of the other facilities when moving to home care.    Finally, we can see that, 
no matter which type of facility residents exit, those requiring greater levels of care and 
without informal caregivers are more likely to be re-hospitalized.   
  The results of our probit estimation of the determinants of nursing home care 
exit are reported in Table 4.    The figures in the second row report changes in the 
probabilities of nursing home exit to home care and hospitals or clinics with respect to a 
one percentage point change in 
N P .    The estimates suggest that a one-percentage 
increase in 
N P   increases the probably to returning to home care by 0.04 percentage 
points in the case of welfare care facility residents and by 3.7 percentage points in the 
case of health care facility residents, while it has no statistically significant effect in the 
case of medical care facility residents.    In contrast, the price effect on the probability 
of being re-hospitalized is significantly negative in the case of health and medical care 
facility residents, while there are no statistically significant effects in the case of welfare 
care facility residents.    The estimated elasticity are minus 3.3 percentage points in the 
case of health care facility residents and minus 1.9 percentage points in the case of 
medical care facility residents.   
  Next, we focus on the effects of the care level and the number of co-resident 
family members as proxies for 
F P  and 
I P.
4    In health care facilities, those whose 
care level is 4 and 5 are more likely to exit to the community than those requiring the 
lowest levels of care, while those requiring care level 4 or 5 are less likely to be 
re-hospitalized.    We can also see that both the probability of exiting to the community   15
and of not being re-hospitalized is larger for the higher care level 5 than for care level 4.   
Living with family members has a small, but statistically significant effect on the 
probability of nursing home exit.    The presence of co-residents tends to increase the 
probability of returning to home care and to decrease the probability of being 
re-hospitalized, in particular for health and medical care  residents.  Finally,  the  severer 
the dementia stage, the smaller is the probability of exit from either health or medical 
care facilities to home care; and the higher is the probability of being re-hospitalized 
from  health  care  facilities.    
  Overall, the results of the probit estimation are consistent with the findings 
based on the duration estimates.    In other words, prices influence an elderly person’s 
destination after exiting a nursing home differently in the different types of nursing 
homes.    Nursing home care provided by welfare and health care facilities is a 
substitute for home care because raising 
N P   increases the probability of exit to home 
care.    Also, nursing home care provided by either health or medical care facilities is a 
complement to hospital care since raising 
N P   reduces the probability of exit to a 
hospital or clinic.    For health care facilities, therefore, an increase in 
N P  reduces  both 
the number of residents by moving them to home care and the number of residents who 
are rotated among health care facilities and hospitals or clinics.     
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
     Using  census  data  from  the  Survey on Care Service Providers (Kaigo Service 
Shisetsu Jigyosho Chosa), this paper addressed two questions: one is how the price 
mechanism can be used to shorten the length of elderly residents’ stay in nursing homes; 
the other is how the price mechanism can be used to reduce the number of socially   16
institutionalized elderly residents by inducing them to return to home care. 
  This study suffers from four limitations.    First, the study could not evaluate 
the determinants of “nursing home entry” since the survey includes only those who are 
already institutionalized.    If it were possible to obtain information on elderly persons’ 
circumstances before they entered nursing homes, we might be able to examine how 
prices influence their choice regarding the type of nursing care facility (i.e., welfare, 
health, or medical care facility).    In order to solve the problem of social 
institutionalization, it is important to assess how large the potential demand for care 
facilities within the community is.    Second, it would have been desirable to estimate 
the income elasticity of demand for institutional care.    Again, this was impossible 
because of the lack of data that could be used to determine an elderly person’s economic 
status, such as income, assets, or education.    Third, as stated earlier, our sample may 
overestimate the length of nursing home stays because of missing data.    This sample 
selection bias may be more serious in the case of our data on residents in welfare care 
facilities, since most residents in these facilities tend to stay for long period, often until 
their death.    Fourth, if we could use information on socially hospitalized patients , it 
would be possible to investigate how the price mechanism effects the exit of residents 
from hospitals.   
  Despite its limitations, this study points the way to a possible solution for the 
problem of social institutionalization and the associated burgeoning costs of the medical 
system in Japan.    An appropriate price policy may work well to shorten residents’ 
length of stay and to reduce the number of socially institutionalized residents.    Since 
the effects of the introduction of a price mechanism may differ for different types of 
facilities, policies aimed at broadening residents’ range of choices need to be designed   17
with care and incorporate an appropriate risk adjustment system to provide a safety net 
for those among the elderly who are at risk of becoming socially institutionalized.   
 
NOTES 
                                                  
1  This is a revised version of our earlier paper (Noguchi and Shimizutani 2002).    The 
research originated in a study on Japan’s long-term care conducted by the Price Policy 
Division of the Cabinet Office.    We would like to thank Koichi Kawabuchi, Shuzo 
Nishimura, Takashi Oshio for their comments and the Ministry of Health, Labour and 
Welfare for providing us with their valuable data set.    The views expressed in this 
paper do not necessarily represent those of the Economic and Social Research Institute 
or of the Japanese government.   
Haruko Noguchi (Corresponding author), Faculty of Social Science, Toyo-Eiwa 
University (Address: 32 Miho-cho, Midori-ku, Yokohama, Kanagawa, 226-0015, Japan; 
Email: hnoguchi@newage3.stanford.edu)   
Satoshi Shimizutani, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University 
(Address: 2-1, Naka, Kunitachi-shi, Tokyo, Japan 186-8603; Email: 
sshimizu@ier.hit-u.ac.jp). 
2  Before the introduction of the long-term care insurance scheme, the decision which 
services to provide for the elderly rested with local governments.    In most cases, 
long-term care services for the elderly were provided free of charge, but patients could 
not choose the care facility or what service they would receive. 
3 Due to the scarcity of welfare care homes in Japan, there are long waiting lists for this 
type of nursing home.    Those who are not admitted to a welfare care facility tend to 
enter health care facilities though they do not need medical care. As a result, health care 
facilities have come to be called “second welfare care facilities.”   18
                                                                                                                                                  
4 We also included interactive terms of copayments and care levels in the regression; 
however, none of the coefficients were statistically significant. 
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=1 for care level 5 0.395 0.156 0.353
(0.489) (0.363) (0.478)
=1 if informal care available 0.202 0.266 0.239
(0.373) (0.379) (0.376)
=1 if male 0.733 0.708 0.650
(0.443) (0.455) (0.477)
Age 85.153 83.432 81.915
(7.828) (7.461) (9.094)
=1 for dementia stage 1 b/ 0.056 0.135 0.102
(0.230) (0.342) (0.302)
=1 for dementia stage 2 0.134 0.249 0.151
(0.341) (0.432) (0.358)
=1 for dementia stage 3 0.243 0.330 0.218
(0.429) (0.470) (0.413)
=1 for dementia stage 4 0.372 0.143 0.246
(0.484) (0.350) (0.431)
=1 for dementia stage 5 0.137 0.022 0.147
(0.344) (0.147) (0.354)
=1 for disability stage 1 c/ 0.130 0.400 0.178
(0.336) (0.490) (0.383)
=1 for disability stage 2 0.251 0.388 0.269
(0.434) (0.487) (0.444)
=1 for disability stage 3 0.602 0.184 0.500
(0.490) (0.387) (0.500)
Table 1: Summary statistics of key variables, by type of nursing home
VariableVariable Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio Haz. Ratio
(Std. error) (Std. error) (Std. error) (Std. error) (Std. error) (Std. error)
Log likelihood
1.017 1.004 1.030 *** 1.018 0.997 1.038 ** 1.002 0.983 1.021 1.018 1.006 1.030 *** 1.019 0.993 1.047 * 1.005 0.983 1.026
(0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.014) (0.011)
=1 for care level 2 1.946 0.824 4.598 * 2.144 1.698 2.706 *** 0.553 0.388 0.790 *** 1.973 0.944 4.123 ** 2.222 1.822 2.709 *** 0.583 0.376 0.905 ***
(0.854) (0.255) (0.100) (0.742) (0.225) (0.131)
=1 for care level 3 2.048 0.870 4.822 * 2.251 1.783 2.842 *** 0.494 0.348 0.702 *** 2.058 0.990 4.278 ** 2.357 1.934 2.872 *** 0.503 0.323 0.782 ***
(0.895) (0.268) (0.088) (0.768) (0.238) (0.113)
=1 for care level 4 1.591 0.672 3.768 2.318 1.833 2.930 *** 0.495 0.350 0.701 *** 1.640 0.774 3.477 2.437 1.997 2.974 *** 0.518 0.334 0.801 ***
(0.700) (0.277) (0.088) (0.629) (0.247) (0.115)
=1 for care level 5 1.366 0.572 3.259 2.492 1.961 3.166 *** 0.423 0.302 0.594 *** 1.390 0.642 3.009 2.633 2.141 3.237 *** 0.442 0.285 0.686 ***
(0.606) (0.304) (0.073) (0.548) (0.278) (0.099)
=1 if informal care availabl 1.116 0.819 1.521 1.078 0.997 1.166 ** 1.143 1.038 1.258 *** 1.100 0.811 1.491 1.083 0.993 1.181 ** 1.158 1.039 1.290 ***
(0.176) (0.043) (0.056) (0.171) (0.048) (0.064)
=1 if male 0.797 0.700 0.909 *** 0.892 0.859 0.926 *** 0.813 0.747 0.884 *** 0.804 0.704 0.918 *** 0.887 0.851 0.925 *** 0.810 0.737 0.891 ***
(0.053) (0.017) (0.035) (0.054) (0.019) (0.039)
Age 1.057 0.946 1.182 0.952 0.921 0.983 *** 1.068 1.012 1.128 *** 1.054 0.954 1.165 0.953 0.920 0.987 *** 1.077 1.018 1.139 ***
(0.060) (0.016) (0.030) (0.054) (0.017) (0.031)
Squared age 1.000 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 *** 1.000 0.999 1.000 *** 1.000 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 *** 0.999 0.999 1.000 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
=1 for dementia stage 1 1.391 1.003 1.928 *** 1.012 0.947 1.082 1.014 0.865 1.189 1.373 0.997 1.890 ** 1.019 0.950 1.092 1.016 0.839 1.230
(0.232) (0.034) (0.082) (0.224) (0.036) (0.099)
=1 for dementia stage 2 1.368 1.036 1.806 *** 0.920 0.867 0.977 *** 0.967 0.836 1.118 1.347 1.049 1.730 *** 0.915 0.858 0.976 *** 0.962 0.808 1.144
(0.194) (0.028) (0.072) (0.172) (0.030) (0.085)
=1 for dementia stage 3 1.307 1.001 1.706 *** 0.829 0.781 0.879 *** 0.955 0.829 1.102 1.283 1.020 1.613 *** 0.819 0.769 0.873 *** 0.940 0.794 1.112
(0.178) (0.025) (0.069) (0.150) (0.026) (0.081)
=1 for dementia stage 4 1.385 1.062 1.807 *** 0.761 0.709 0.816 *** 0.947 0.821 1.093 1.361 1.076 1.722 *** 0.745 0.690 0.805 *** 0.935 0.789 1.109
(0.188) (0.027) (0.069) (0.163) (0.029) (0.081)
=1 for dementia stage 5 1.428 1.070 1.906 *** 0.838 0.738 0.952 *** 0.946 0.805 1.111 1.396 1.082 1.801 *** 0.824 0.712 0.954 *** 0.946 0.791 1.132
(0.210) (0.054) (0.078) (0.182) (0.062) (0.087)
=1 for disability stage 1 0.672 0.275 1.644 1.001 0.680 1.471 0.633 0.469 0.853 *** 0.666 0.330 1.345 0.985 0.698 1.391 0.651 0.462 0.916 ***
(0.307) (0.197) (0.097) (0.239) (0.173) (0.114)
=1 for disability stage 2 0.589 0.240 1.444 0.955 0.648 1.405 0.587 0.438 0.788 *** 0.583 0.286 1.187 * 0.935 0.662 1.321 0.600 0.428 0.839 ***
(0.269) (0.188) (0.088) (0.212) (0.165) (0.103)
=1 for disability stage 3 0.566 0.230 1.393 0.935 0.633 1.379 0.557 0.416 0.744 *** 0.564 0.275 1.160 * 0.911 0.643 1.291 0.550 0.390 0.775 ***
(0.260) (0.185) (0.083) (0.207) (0.162) (0.096)
Table 2: Determinants of long-term care facility exit 


















From health care facility From medical care facility From welfare care facility From health care facility From medical care facility From welfare care facilityFigure 1: Patients' status after exit from nursing home, by type of facility
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Location after exit from             
medical care facility (n=2,828)
Location after exit from                
health care facility (n=14,134)
Location after exit from                
welfare care facility  (n=1,556)
Home Welfare care facility Health/medical care facility Hospital/Clinic Dead TruncatedVariable
(Standard deviation) Home careHospital or Home careHospital or Home careHospital or
Clinic Clinic Clinic
(n=56) (n=502) (n=6,211) (n=5,323) (n=616) (n=877)
Natural log of individual co-payment 8.152 5.243 9.284 9.020 8.710 8.782
(3.236) (4.360)  (1.684) (2.033)  (3.058) (2.913) 
=1 for care level 1 0.232 0.088 0.226 0.121 0.264 0.080
(0.397) (0.397)  (0.389) (0.413)  (0.388) (0.394) 
=1 for care level 2 0.214 0.092 0.233 0.184 0.198 0.103
(0.414) (0.289)  (0.423) (0.388)  (0.399) (0.304) 
=1 for care level 3 0.196 0.151 0.225 0.215 0.192 0.121
(0.401) (0.359)  (0.418) (0.411)  (0.394) (0.326) 
=1 for care level 4 0.179 0.285 0.208 0.272 0.177 0.295
(0.386) (0.452)  (0.406) (0.445)  (0.382) (0.456) 
=1 for care level 5 0.179 0.384 0.108 0.208 0.169 0.401
(0.386) (0.487)  (0.310) (0.406)  (0.375) (0.490) 
=1if living with spouse 0.304 0.050 0.241 0.248 0.373 0.331
(0.464) (0.218)  (0.428) (0.432)  (0.484) (0.471) 
=1 if living with son 0.429 0.163 0.534 0.490 0.468 0.412
(0.499) (0.370)  (0.499) (0.500)  (0.499) (0.492) 
=1 if living with daughter 0.196 0.295 0.203 0.162 0.151 0.154
(0.401) (0.456)  (0.402) (0.368)  (0.358) (0.361) 
=1 if living with daughter-in-law 0.375 0.122 0.481 0.426 0.399 0.293
(0.489) (0.327)  (0.500) (0.495)  (0.490) (0.455) 
=1 if living with son-in-law 0.071 0.239 0.123 0.090 0.076 0.079
(0.260) (0.427)  (0.329) (0.287)  (0.266) (0.269) 
=1 if living with father or mother 0.268 0.060 0.002 0.003 0.011 0.010
(0.447) (0.237)  (0.046) (0.058)  (0.106) (0.101) 
=1 if living with grandson or granddaughter 0.054 0.195 0.390 0.331 0.321 0.274
(0.227) (0.397)  (0.488) (0.470)  (0.467) (0.446) 
=1 if living alone 0.089 0.127 0.096 0.157 0.122 0.179
(0.288) (0.334)  (0.295) (0.364)  (0.327) (0.384) 
=1 if male 0.768 0.273 0.738 0.666 0.640 0.631
(0.426) (0.446)  (0.440) (0.472)  (0.481) (0.483) 
Age 82.357 84.076 83.262 83.490 79.894 80.608
(8.804) (8.097)  (7.415) (7.578)  (9.447) (9.581) 
=1 for dementia stage 1 0.161 0.050 0.171 0.104 0.174 0.095
(0.371) (0.218)  (0.377) (0.305)  (0.379) (0.293) 
=1 for dementia stage 2 0.321 0.143 0.272 0.225 0.205 0.144
(0.471) (0.351)  (0.445) (0.418)  (0.404) (0.351) 
=1 for dementia stage 3 0.214 0.243 0.285 0.361 0.183 0.228
(0.414) (0.429)  (0.451) (0.480)  (0.387) (0.420) 
=1 for dementia stage 4 0.161 0.371 0.092 0.195 0.112 0.290
(0.371) (0.483)  (0.289) (0.397)  (0.316) (0.454) 
=1 for dementia stage 5 0.054 0.133 0.012 0.032 0.045 0.135
(0.227) (0.340)  (0.108) (0.175)  (0.208) (0.341) 
=1 for disability stage 1 0.054 0.008 0.037 0.014 0.075 0.015
(0.227) (0.089)  (0.189) (0.116)  (0.263) (0.121) 
=1 for disability stage 2 0.411 0.137 0.469 0.297 0.352 0.130
(0.496) (0.345)  (0.500) (0.457)  (0.478) (0.336) 
=1 for disability stage 3 0.250 0.277 0.358 0.418 0.300 0.275







Table 3: Summary statistics for marginal effects of co-payment on nursing home exit by type of facilityVariable
(Standard errors) Home care Hospital or Home care Hospital or Home care Hospital or
Clinic Clinic Clinic
Constant -0.0305 0.2721 0.9093 ** -1.3629 ** 0.0111 -0.4005 **
(0.3016) (0.7876) (0.2046) (0.2061) (0.1123) (0.1416)
Natural log of individual co-payment 0.0004 ** -0.0044 0.0365 ** -0.0326 ** 0.0003 -0.0191 **
(0.0018) (0.0045) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0035) (0.0044)
=1 for care level 2 -0.0012 -0.0164 -0.0261 * 0.0182 -0.0248 0.0284
(0.0271) (0.0695) (0.0129) (0.0130) (0.0313) (0.0394)
=1 for care level 3 -0.0004 -0.1082 0.0077 -0.0227 -0.0302 -0.0485
(0.0260) (0.0664) (0.0137) (0.0138) (0.0324) (0.0408)
=1 for care level 4 -0.0009 -0.1228 * 0.0595 ** -0.0996 ** -0.0675 ** -0.0146
(0.0269) (0.0685) (0.0153) (0.0154) (0.0329) (0.0415)
=1 for care level 5 -0.0013 -0.0842 0.1076 ** -0.1221 ** -0.0166 -0.0060
(0.0273) (0.0696) (0.0182) (0.0183) (0.0349) (0.0439)
=1if living with spouse 0.0010 -0.0918 * 0.0663 ** -0.0480 ** 0.0591 ** -0.0003
(0.0176) (0.0453) (0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0218) (0.0275)
=1 if living with son -0.0006 -0.0806 0.0283 * -0.0258 -0.0277 0.0715 **
(0.0190) (0.0487) (0.0140) (0.0141) (0.0248) (0.0312)
=1 if living with daughter 0.0010 -0.0218 0.0818 ** -0.0457 ** 0.0366 -0.0005
(0.0232) (0.0597) (0.0168) (0.0169) (0.0311) (0.0391)
=1 if living with daughter-in-law 0.0016 0.0269 0.0909 ** -0.0311 ** 0.0890 ** -0.1221 **
(0.0187) (0.0478) (0.0137) (0.0138) (0.0254) (0.0320)
=1 if living with son-in-law 0.00003 0.0562 0.0563 ** -0.0375 * 0.0090 0.0091
(0.0300) (0.0763) (0.0182) (0.0183) (0.0380) (0.0479)
=1 if living with father or mother -0.00004 0.0007 0.0240 -0.0232 0.0079 0.0088
(0.0159) (0.0409) (0.0096) (0.0096) (0.0199) (0.0250)
=1 if living with grandson or granddaughter -0.0029 * 0.0474 0.0474 ** -0.0305 ** -0.0345 0.0419
(0.0220) (0.0566) (0.0161) (0.0162) (0.0308) (0.0388)
=1 if living alone -0.0022 -0.0872 -0.2019 ** 0.0639 -0.0907 0.1470 **
(0.0222) (0.0571) (0.0359) (0.0362) (0.0483) (0.0607)
=1 if male 0.0013 -0.0237 0.0594 ** -0.0698 ** 0.0236 -0.0212
(0.0125) (0.0321) (0.0095) (0.0096) (0.0168) (0.0212)
Age 0.00001 0.0013 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0069 0.0004 **
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Squared age -0.000001 * -0.00005 ** -0.00001 -0.000005 -0.0001 -0.00003 **
(0.000004) (0.00001) (0.000004) (0.000004) (0.00001) (0.00001)
=1 for dementia stage 1 0.0023 * -0.0186 -0.0489 ** 0.0175 -0.0264 0.0433
(0.0305) (0.0782) (0.0151) (0.0152) (0.0302) (0.0380)
=1 for dementia stage 2 0.0014 0.0472 -0.0973 ** 0.0408 ** -0.0445 ** 0.0327
(0.0265) (0.0679) (0.0140) (0.0141) (0.0282) (0.0355)
=1 for dementia stage 3 0.0016 0.0544 -0.1287 ** 0.0479 ** -0.0484 ** 0.0336
(0.0269) (0.0689) (0.0153) (0.0154) (0.0286) (0.0360)
=1 for dementia stage 4 0.0014 0.0850 -0.1686 ** 0.0857 ** -0.0796 ** 0.0405
(0.0275) (0.0705) (0.0184) (0.0186) (0.0296) (0.0373)
=1 for dementia stage 5 0.0003 0.0636 -0.2120 ** 0.1094 ** -0.0715 ** -0.0510
(0.0297) (0.0763) (0.0302) (0.0304) (0.0330) (0.0416)
=1 for disability stage 1 0.0004 -0.3200 0.0784 0.0094 -0.0709 0.0859
(0.0857) (0.2196) (0.0903) (0.0909) (0.0637) (0.0802)
=1 for disability stage 2 -0.0005 -0.1818 0.0667 0.0580 -0.0915 ** 0.1693 **
(0.0752) (0.1922) (0.0875) (0.0882) (0.0523) (0.0658)
=1 for disability stage 3 -0.0006 -0.1448 -0.0148 0.1219 -0.1109 ** 0.2169 **
(0.0771) (0.1967) (0.0880) (0.0887) (0.0552) (0.0695)
Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 5%-, 10%-, and 15%-significance level, respectively. All regressions are controlled for
facility dummies.  The definitions of care level, dementia, and disability stages are shown in the footnotes for Table 1
Table 4:  Marginal effect of co-payment on nursing care exit by type of facility: Probit estimate
Exit from welfare care
facility to:
Exit from health care
facility to:
Exit from care medical
care facility: